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I. INTRODUCTION 
Brand name drug manufacturers invest approximately $2.6 
billion and a decade’s worth of time bringing a drug to market.1  
Generic drug manufacturers are able to enter the market quickly after 
a brand name drug’s patent expires without costly clinical research 
trials.  After generic competitors enter the market, brand name drugs 
usually lose upwards of ninety percent of their market share.2  Brand 
name companies are upset with generic manufacturers’ ability to “free-
ride” on their investment in research and development (R&D) and 
marketing.  Generics claim that they are primarily able to offer lower 
priced products because they do not have to market their drugs or 
details to physicians in order to get their product into the hands of 
patients.3 
Both brand and generic drug manufacturers serve important 
roles in treating and curing diseases.  They are also extremely 
profitable.  Nonetheless, in an effort to continue profiting from their 
initial investment, brand name manufacturers have engaged in 
questionable practices, such as pay-for-delay settlements and product 
hopping.  Federal courts have reviewed such practices using nuanced 
antitrust frameworks and arrived at differing conclusions.  Generics, 
meanwhile, have traditionally been protected by the federal and state 
government because they help to limit health care costs, but in recent 
 
* J.D. Candidate, 2017, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A. University of 
Pennsylvania.  Thank you to my family, especially my parents, for their unwavering 
support and confidence in my work.  Many thanks to my advisor, Professor Jordan 
Paradise, for her thoughtful comments.  
 1  PhRMA, 2015 PROFILE: BIOPHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH INDUSTRY (2015), 
http://www.phrma.org/sites/default/files/pdf/2015_phrma_profile.pdf.   
 2  FED. TRADE COMM’N, PAY-FOR-DELAY: HOW DRUG COMPANY PAY-OFFS COST 
CONSUMERS BILLIONS 8 (2010), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents 
/reports/pay-delay-how-drug-company-pay-offs-cost-consumers-billions-federal-trade-
commission-staff-study/100112payfordelayrpt.pdf. 
 3  Mylan Pharms., Inc. v. Warner Chilcott Pub. Ltd., No. 12-3824, 2015 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 50026, at *36 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 16, 2015) (internal citations omitted).   
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years it is unclear if all generics are as well-intentioned as they have 
been portrayed.  It is unclear what steps government agencies can take 
at this time without being given additional powers from Congress. 
Part II provides a primer of the drug approval processes of both 
brand name and generic drugs.  It examines the unique quality of the 
pharmaceutical market, explains the current patent system, and lays 
the foundation for understanding relevant antitrust law.  Part III delves 
into how federal agencies are involved in regulating anticompetitive 
practices that have the potential to harm patients, specifically pay-for-
delay settlements and product hopping.  Part IV explores three recent 
product hopping cases and explains how they reached differing 
results.  Lastly, Part V concludes. 
II. A PRIMER ON THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE REGARDING DRUG APPROVAL 
A. The Drug Approval Process, Patents, and the Hatch-Waxman Act 
Drug patents, while similar to U.S. Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA) market exclusivity rights, are distinct.4  Drug patents are 
property rights approved by the United States Patent and Trademark 
Office (USPTO).5  Patents allow their holders “to exclude others from 
making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention throughout 
the United States or importing the invention into the United States” 
for twenty years in exchange for public disclosure when the patent is 
granted.6  Patents may be granted at any point in the course of drug 
development and drugs are eligible to receive more than one patent if 
they meet appropriate criteria.7  Patents expire twenty years from the 
date of filing.8  Patents and exclusivity may run concurrently, but it is 
not a requirement that they do so.9 
Brand name drugs are those that initially seek approval from the 
FDA using a New Drug Application (NDA).  FDA approval is required 
before a drug may be introduced into interstate commerce.10  A 
company that has submitted a NDA will “undergo a long, 
comprehensive, and costly testing process, after which, if successful, 
 
 4  Frequently Asked Questions on Patents and Exclusivity, U.S. FDA (July 18, 2014), 
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/ucm079031.htm#Whatist
hedifferencebetweenpatentsandexclusivity?. 
 5  How Can I Better Understand Patents and Exclusivity?, U.S. FDA (Jan. 16, 2015), 
http://www.fda.gov/ForIndustry/FDABasicsforIndustry/ucm238582.htm. 
 6  35 U.S.C. § 154(a) (2006). 
 7  U.S. FDA, supra note 5. 
 8  U.S. FDA, supra note 4. 
 9  Id. 
 10  21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2006). 
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the manufacturer will receive marketing approval.”11  In addition to 
marketing approval, the FDA will confer market exclusivity upon a 
drug that receives NDA approval.12  This protection can prevent the 
approval or market entrance of certain 505(b)(2) applications,13 as well 
as abbreviated new drug applications (ANDAs) for prescribed periods 
of time.14  The duration of the exclusivity varies by type of drug.15 
The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 
1984, more commonly known as the Hatch-Waxman Act, has had two 
important effects on the pharmaceutical industry.  First, generic drug 
manufacturers are permitted to use the streamlined ANDA process.16  
Second, the first generic ANDA paragraph IV certification filer is 
eligible for 180 days of marketing exclusivity.17 
“A generic drug product is one that is comparable to an innovator 
drug product in dosage form, strength, route of administration, 
quality, performance characteristics and intended use.”18  Congress 
enacted the Hatch-Waxman Act to enable generic drug companies to 
introduce their cheaper products into the market quicker.19  Prior to 
the Hatch-Waxman Act in 1984, over one hundred branded drugs were 
without generic counterparts despite the fact that their patents had 
already expired.20  At that time, generics comprised only nineteen 
 
 11  FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2228 (2013).  See also 21 U.S.C. §355(b)(1) 
(2006). 
 12  U.S. FDA, supra note 4.  See also 21 C.F.R. § 211.1 (2016); 21 U.S.C. § 
355(j)(5)(F)(ii) (2006). 
 13  § 355(b)(2).  505(b)(2) applications rely on at least one investigation “not 
conducted by or for the applicant and for which the applicant has not obtained a right 
of reference or use from the person by or for whom the investigations were 
conducted.”  Id. 
 14 Small Business Assistance: Frequently Asked Questions for New Drug Product Exclusivity, 
U.S. FDA (Feb. 11, 2016), http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess 
/SmallBusinessAssistance/ucm069962.htm. 
 15  U.S. FDA, supra note 4. 
 16  M. Sean Royall et al., Antitrust Scrutiny of Pharmaceutical “Product Hopping”, 28 
ANTITRUST 71, 72 (Fall 2013). 
 17  Small Business Assistance: 180-Day Generic Drug Exclusivity, U.S. FDA (Feb. 11, 
2016), http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/SmallBusiness 
Assistance/ucm069964.htm. 
 18  Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA): Generics, U.S. FDA (Nov. 16, 2016), 
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/HowDrugsareDevelopeda
ndApproved/ApprovalApplications/AbbreviatedNewDrugApplicationANDAGeneric
s/default.htm. 
 19  Aaron S. Kesselheim & Jonathan J. Darrow, Hatch-Waxman Turns 30: Do We Need 
a Re-Designed Approach for the Modern Era?, 15 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 293, 297 
(2015).   
 20  Id. at 300.  See Gerald J. Mossinghoff, Overview of the Hatch-Waxman Act and Its 
Impact on the Drug Development Process, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 187, 187 (1999).   
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percent of prescriptions,21 whereas now generic scripts account for 
nearly eighty percent of prescriptions in the United States.22  In 2016, 
brand name sales accounted for $244 billion and generic sales 
amounted to $70 billion in the United States.23  The Congressional 
Budget Office estimates that generic drugs reduce costs at retail 
pharmacies by $8 billion to $10 billion a year.24   
When lobbying for its passage, advocates of Hatch-Waxman 
championed it “as the best possible compromise between two 
competing economic interests,” namely a push to develop new 
groundbreaking drugs by brand name manufacturers and a 
mechanism to get these life-saving drugs to patients in a quick and cost-
effective manner.25  The Act allows cheaper generics to enter the 
market faster by shortening the ANDA approval process; importantly, 
clinical trials, which are incredibly expensive and time-consuming, are 
not required since the generics demonstrate their bioequivalence in 
their applications.26  To be a bioequivalent means that a drug has 
the same active ingredients, is “of the same pharmacological or 
therapeutic class . . . and can be expected to have the same therapeutic 
effect.”27  The generic must also have the same labeling as the listed 
drug.28  The generic must not seek approval for a use that has not 
already been approved for the listed drug.29  Additionally, generics 
must also meet Current Good Manufacturing Practices (CGMP).30  
Lastly, there must be a patent certification indicating one of the 
following: (I) the patent information for the listed drug has not been 
filed; (II) that the patent expired; (III) the particular date the patent 
is set to expire; or (IV) the patent is invalid or will not be infringed 
 
 21  Kesselheim & Darrow, supra note 19, at 300.  See Mossinghoff, supra note 20, at 
187. 
 22  Facts about Generic Drugs, U.S. FDA (June 19, 2015), http://www.fda.gov/drugs/ 
resourcesforyou/consumers/buyingusingmedicinesafely/understandinggenericdrug
s/ucm167991.htm. 
 23  2016 Top Markets Report Pharmaceuticals, DEP’T. OF COM., INT’L TRADE ADMIN 3 
(2016), http://trade.gov/topmarkets/pdf/Pharmaceuticals_Executive_Summary 
.pdf. 
 24  What Are Generic Drugs?, U.S. FDA (June 19, 2015), http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/ 
ResourcesForYou/Consumers/BuyingUsingMedicineSafely/UnderstandingGeneric
Drugs/ucm144456.htm. 
 25  H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 2 at 7 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2686, 
2691. 
 26  FDA, supra note 18. 
 27  21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(iv) (2006).   
 28  § 355(j)(2)(A)(v).   
 29  § 355(j)(2)(A)(viii).   
 30  21 C.F.R. § 211.1 (2016). 
OTT  (DO NOT DELETE) 5/2/2017  1:11 PM 
2017] COMMENT 853 
upon by the product up for approval.31 
Congress delegates full power to approve drugs for safety 
purposes to the FDA.  However, once drugs enter the marketplace, the 
FDA has almost no role in evaluating alleged regulatory gaming 
practices “because it explicitly avoids consideration of competition 
effects when approving pharmaceutical products.”32  Therefore, due to 
a lack of FDA oversight, the Hatch-Waxman system is ripe for 
manipulation. 
Paragraph IV certifications under the Hatch-Waxman Act allow a 
generic company to enter the market before the patent of a brand 
name drug expires if the generic challenger can “declare that its 
product does not infringe the relevant patents or that the relevant 
patents are invalid.”33  Generics have found it worthwhile to challenge 
patents “because the first generic to file its application can obtain 180 
days of marketing exclusivity during which it is the only generic on the 
market.”34  However, by using the paragraph IV certification in the 
ANDA, the submission is technically “an infringing act if the generic 
product is intended to be marketed before expiration of the patent,” 
and the generic ANDA has opened itself up to patent infringement 
litigation.35  Many of these suits result in reverse payment settlements, 
which are discussed in more depth below. 
 
 31  21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii) (2006).  The FDA also provides that: 
A certification under paragraph I or II permits the ANDA to be approved 
immediately, if it is otherwise eligible.  A certification under paragraph 
III indicates that the ANDA may be approved on the patent expiration 
date.  A paragraph IV certification begins a process in which the question 
of whether the listed patent is valid or will be infringed by the proposed 
generic product may be answered by the courts prior to the expiration 
of the patent. . . . The statute provides that the first applicant to file a 
substantially complete ANDA containing a paragraph IV certification to 
a listed patent will be eligible for a 180-day period of exclusivity.  
Gary Buehler, Dir., Office of Generic Drugs, Regulatory Pathway: Abbreviated New Drug 
Application, FDA (Jan. 9, 2007), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/Centers 
Offices/CDER/ucm118356.pdf. 
 32  Brief for Intellectual Property and Antitrust Law Professors as Amici Curiae at 
10–11, Mylan Pharms., Inc. v. Warner Chilcott Pub. Ltd., No. 12-3824, 2015 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 50026, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 16, 2015); see also aaiPharma Inc. v. Thompson, 296 
F.3d 227, 241 (4th Cir. 2002) (describing the FDA’s approach to Hatch-Waxman as 
“focus[ing] on its primary task of ensuring that drugs are safe and effective” while 
letting private parties sort out their respective rights). 
 33  FTC, supra note 2; see also Kesselheim & Darrow, supra note 19, at 302–03. 
 34  Id. 
 35  Small Business Assistance: 180-Day Generic Drug Exclusivity, U.S. FDA (Feb. 11, 
2016), 
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/SmallBusinessAssistance/
ucm069964.htm. 
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Upon receiving FDA approval, a company can begin to market its 
product.36  Brand name drugs traditionally hire a large sales force and 
have enormous marketing and advertising budgets.37  By contrast, 
because generics are permitted (and one could argue actually 
encouraged, based on Congress’s rationale for enacting Hatch-
Waxman) “to piggy-back on the pioneer’s approval efforts,” they are 
able to more quickly enter the market and stimulate competition.38  By 
removing the cost barriers associated with R&D and marketing, 
thereby lowering the price of drugs, the Act makes generics a viable 
and attractive alternative to brand name drugs.39  The Act saved 
consumers approximately $239 billion in 2013 alone thanks to 
increased generic competition.40 
B. The Uniqueness of the Pharmaceutical Market 
The Hatch-Waxman Act was partially a response to the realization 
that the pharmaceutical market is unlike any other.  Put simply, the 
pharmaceutical market is not efficient.41  A healthcare professional 
prescribing a drug has no incentive to be concerned with price because 
she is not paying for it and the cost of a drug in no way affects how she 
is compensated.42  Traditionally, physicians will prescribe the 
blockbuster drug that was marketed to them, thereby promoting the 
brand name drug’s market dominance.43  Patients lack the expertise to 
know which drug will best meet their needs, so they rely on their 
healthcare professionals to act according to their best interest.44  While 
patients can approach their prescribers about drugs they saw in direct-
to-consumer advertising, it is ultimately the healthcare professional’s 
decision as to what drug is prescribed.  Often it is the third-party 
 
 36  Royall et al., supra note 16, at 72. 
 37  Id. 
 38  New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d 638, 646 (2d Cir. 2015) 
(citing FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2228 (2013)), cert. dismissed, 136 S. Ct. 581 
(2015).  
 39  Brief for Intellectual Property and Antitrust Law Professors as Amici Curiae, 
supra note 32; see H.R. Rep. No. 98-857(II), pt. 1, p. 4 (1984) (stating that Congress 
enacted Hatch-Waxman to allow generics to compete via “following on” branded drugs 
because other paths to get generics to market are not cost-effective).   
 40  Brief for Federal Trade Commission Supporting Petitioner-Appellant at 7 n.8, 
Mylan Pharms., Inc. v. Warner Chilcott Pub. Ltd., No. 12-3824, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
50026, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 16, 2015). 
 41  New York v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d at 646. 
 42  Id.; see also F.T.C., BUREAU OF ECONOMICS, GENERIC SUBSTITUTION AND 
PRESCRIPTION DRUG PRICES: ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF STATE DRUG PRODUCT SELECTION 
LAWS (1985). 
 43  F.T.C., supra note 42.   
 44  New York v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d at 646; see also F.T.C., supra note 42. 
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payors, such as Medicare, Medicaid, or private insurers that directly 
experience the high cost of brand name drugs, as opposed to patients 
or healthcare professionals who are the ones selecting which product 
to use; it is this disconnect which makes the pharmaceutical market 
inefficient.45 
C. An Effort to Combat the Inefficient Market: State Substitution Laws 
“A generic drug is identical–or bioequivalent–to a brand name 
drug in dosage form, safety, strength, route of administration, quality, 
performance characteristics and intended use.”46  State substitution 
laws, otherwise known as drug product selection (DPS) laws, are 
adopted on a state-by-state basis with the goal of lowering drug prices 
by substituting cheaper versions of the brand name drugs prescribed 
by healthcare professionals.47  DPS laws require or allow a pharmacist 
“to substitute generic versions of brand-name prescriptions” without 
direction from the prescribing physician.48  All fifty states have such 
laws in place.49  DPS laws in thirty states require that the generic version 
have the same AB-rating as the brand name drug for which it is being 
substituted.50  An AB-rating requires that a generic be the bioequivalent 
and pharmaceutical equivalent of the brand drug.51  While twelve states 
affirmatively “require pharmacists to substitute generic drugs, unless the 
physician prescribes otherwise,” thirty-nine states allow the substitution 
so long as there is AB equivalence.52  New York, for example, requires 
pharmacists to “substitute a less expensive drug product containing the 
same active ingredients, dosage form and strength as the drug product 
prescribed” so long as the drug is on the list of generics approved by 
the state.53  Twenty states have “therapeutic substitution” rules, which 
allow a generic (including a non-AB rated generic) to be substituted 
 
 45  New York v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d at 646. 
 46  FDA, supra note 24. 
 47  F.T.C., supra note 42.   
 48  Michael A. Carrier, A Real-World Analysis of Pharmaceutical Settlements: The Missing 
Dimension of Product Hopping, 62 FLA. L. REV. 1009, 1017 (2010).   
 49  Id.   
 50  Id. at 1018. 
 51  New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d 638, 645 (2d Cir. 2015) 
(“meaning it has the same active ingredient, dosage form, strength, and route of 
administration as the brand drug”), cert. dismissed, 136 S. Ct. 581 (2015); see also U.S. 
DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., FDA, APPROVED DRUG PRODUCTS WITH THERAPEUTIC 
EQUIVALENCE EVALUATIONS vii-ix (37th ed. 2016), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/ 
Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/UCM071436.pdf. 
 52  Mylan Pharms., Inc. v. Warner Chilcott Pub. Ltd., No. 12-3824, 2015 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 50026, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 16, 2015) (emphasis added).  
 53  N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6816-a (Consol. 2015). 
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for a brand name drug at the pharmacist’s discretion.54 
DPS laws attempt to correct the inefficiencies in the 
pharmaceutical market by shifting the power from prescribing 
healthcare professionals to pharmacists.55  Pharmacists are incentivized 
to substitute less expensive drugs “because the retail dollar gross 
margin on the generic is higher.”56  Some of the savings from cheaper 
drugs are passed on to patients, particularly those paying out of 
pocket.57  Generic companies, insurers, and pharmacists who may 
benefit from the sale of, or savings from, generic substitution rely on 
state substitution laws to get generics into the hands of patients.58  
Consequently, substitution laws have a dramatic effect on how 
prescriptions are dispensed, particularly when applied to product 
hopping, which will be discussed infra Parts II.B-IV.59 
D. The Sherman Act and the Importance of Defining the Relevant 
Market 
The FDA’s primary role is evaluating the safety and efficacy of 
drugs; it is not tasked with playing a role in the monitoring of the 
competitive conduct of pharmaceutical companies.  The Federal 
Trade Commission (FTC), however, has a mission “[t]o prevent 
business practices that are anticompetitive or deceptive or unfair to 
consumers; to enhance informed consumer choice and public 
understanding of the competitive process; and to accomplish this 
without unduly burdening legitimate business activity.”60  The FTC 
took a special interest in the health care market and formed a 
dedicated health care division within the Bureau of Competition in the 
1970s.61  “Through vigorous enforcement of the antitrust laws, the FTC 
 
 54  Defendant’s Opposition to Summary Judgment at 30, Mylan Pharms., Inc. v. 
Warner Chilcott Pub. Ltd., No. 12-3824, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50026 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 
16, 2015). 
 55  F.T.C., supra note 42, at 1. 
 56  Id. at 7. 
 57  Id. at 35. 
 58  See, e.g., Brief for Federal Trade Commission, supra note 40, at 5 (internal 
citation omitted) (“[R]etail pharmacies have financial incentives to make efficient 
generic substitutions and because they compete with other pharmacies on price 
because they earn greater profits on generics than brand-name drugs.”).   
 59  See discussion infra Section III.B.2. 
 60  About the FTC, FED. TRADE COMMISSION, https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc (last 
visited Feb. 26, 2017).  
 61  Markus H. Meier, Bradley S. Albert & Saralisa C. Brau, Health Care Division, 
Bureau of Competition, Federal Trade Commission, Overview of FTC Antitrust Actions 
in Pharmaceutical Products and Distribution, FED. TRADE COMMISSION (January 2017), 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/attachments/competition-policy-
guidance/overview_pharma_january_2017.pdf. 
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has taken an active role in ensuring that consumers benefit from 
competition in the pharmaceutical industry.”62 
A recent Second Circuit decision, citing a landmark United States 
Supreme Court case, held that antitrust analysis is applicable to 
anticompetitive activities in the Hatch-Waxman context.63  FTC v. 
Actavis “specifically upheld antitrust applicability to the 
pharmaceutical industry, even where the alleged ‘anticompetitive 
effects fall within the scope of the exclusionary potential of the 
patent.’”64  That case looked specifically at Section 2 of the Sherman 
Act. 
“Section 2 of the Sherman Act makes it an offense to ‘monopolize, 
or attempt to monopolize . . . any part of the trade or commerce 
among the several States.’”65  In order to be guilty of a violation, the 
plaintiff must demonstrate “that the defendant possessed monopoly 
power in the relevant market” and “that it willfully acquired or 
maintained that power.”66  Before a violation can be found, therefore, 
the court must identify the monopoly power and the relevant market.  
This is a fact-sensitive inquiry.67 
The definition of the relevant market varies by each type of case.  
Therefore, the unique quality of the pharmaceutical market (i.e. the 
disconnect between prescribers and payors68) is an important 
component in the analysis.69  Determining the relevant market is often 
the decisive issue.70 
There are a number of different ways Section 2 has been litigated 
in the pharmaceutical context.  When drug company mergers are 
 
 62  Generic Drug Entry Prior to Patent Expiration: An FTC Study, FED. TRADE COMMISSION 
(July 2002), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/generic-
drug-entry-prior-patent-expiration-ftc-study/genericdrugstudy_0.pdf. 
 63  Brief for Intellectual Property and Antitrust Law Professors as Amici Curiae, 
supra note 32, at 8. 
 64  Id. at 10 (citing FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2230 (2013)) (holding that 
reverse-payment settlements under the Hatch-Waxman “drug-regulatory framework” 
engineered to delay generic entry may violate the Sherman Act). 
 65  New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d 638, 651 (2d Cir. 2015), 
cert. dismissed, 136 S. Ct. 581 (2015). 
 66  Id. (citing Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 
U.S. 398, 407 (2004) (quoting United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 
(1966))).   
 67  M. Howard Morse, Product Market Definition in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 71 
ANTIRUST L.J. 633, 656 (2003). 
 68  New York v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d at 646. 
 69  Brief Supporting Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 40, at 16 (quoting Verizon 
Commc’ns Inc., 540 U.S. at 411) (“Antitrust inquiries ‘must always be attuned to the 
particular structure and circumstances of the industry at issue.’”). 
 70  Morse, supra note 67, at 652. 
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challenged, for example, the market will be determined by criteria 
such as the: (1) drugs for a specific condition or disease, (2) 
mechanism of action, and (3) specific compound.71  These three 
classifications resemble how drug classes are designated.  “A drug class 
is a group of drugs that have something in common” such as a similar 
purpose, mechanism, or chemical structure.72  When the FTC 
challenges reverse payment settlements, however, the relevant market 
is usually more limited—it is restricted to the brand name drug and its 
generic equivalents.73  While one Third Circuit judge claims that single-
product markets are rarely defined because by default the 
manufacturer will have a monopoly power,74 other courts have been 
more willing to define the market narrowly (i.e. as a specific drug and 
its fellow AB-rated generics).75 
III. THE EVOLUTION OF REGULATORY GAMING PRACTICES 
Because of the large costs involved in the research and 
development of blockbuster drugs, brand name drug manufacturers 
seek to maximize their profits and maintain patent exclusivity for as 
long as possible.  Therefore, it is unsurprising that brand 
pharmaceutical manufacturers have used creative practices in an 
attempt to extend their market dominance.  While drug companies 
have used numerous methods to manipulate the patent and drug 
approval system,76 two practices in particular have received a great deal 
of attention and will serve as the focus of this Comment. 
A. Reverse Payment Settlements 
The FTC targeted reverse payment settlements (also known as 
pay-for-delay settlements) because of their dangerous anticompetitive 
effects.77  Brand name patent holders frequently challenge ANDAs 
filed by generic drug manufacturers.78  Because the Hatch-Waxman Act 
prevents competing generics from entering the market for six months 
 
 71  Id. at 650. 
 72  Drug Names and Classes, PUBMED HEALTH (Aug. 20, 2015), http://www.ncbi.nlm. 
nih.gov/pubmedhealth/drug-names-and-classes/. 
 73  Morse, supra note 67. 
 74  Mylan Pharms., Inc. v. Warner Chilcott Pub. Ltd. Co., No. 12-3824, 2015 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 50026, at *23 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 16, 2015). 
 75  See, e.g., New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d 638, 638 (2d 
Cir. 2015), cert. dismissed, 136 S. Ct. 581 (2015); In re Suboxone (Buprenorphine 
Hydrochloride & Naloxone) Antitrust Litig., 64 F. Supp. 3d 665 (E.D. Pa. 2014). 
 76  Including authorized generics, rebate cards, patient assistance programs, etc. 
 77  FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2237 (2013). 
 78  Id. at 2227. 
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after the first-filer’s entry, brand pharmaceuticals will pay a premium 
(in the form of a settlement) to prevent the first-filer from entering 
the market before its patent expires.79  Patent exclusivity is so lucrative 
for brand name companies that it justifies paying millions of dollars to 
settle with generic competitors in order to preserve the monopoly as 
they approach the patent cliff.80  This maneuver has the benefit of 
preventing all generic drugs from entering the market because no 
company can begin competing until six months after the first-filer’s 
entry, which de facto always has to be after the settlement ends.81  Pay-
for-delay settlements allow brand name manufacturers to stockpile 
profits for longer than Hatch-Waxman anticipated by controlling when 
generic competitors can enter the market.82 
The exclusivity period is significant in light of DPS laws because 
during the 180-day exclusivity period, patients picking up their drugs 
from pharmacies will likely be switched from a brand name drug to a 
generic.  Since essentially only AB-rated generics can be substituted, 
the bulk of the population taking the brand name drug will receive 
and begin using the exclusive generic on the market.  Additionally, the 
initial generic manufacturer can keep its price relatively high in the 
absence of generic competitors who could stimulate lower prices.83 
The FTC began intervening in pay-for-delay settlements in 2001 
when it realized that pharmaceutical manufacturers were “exploiting 
the statutory and regulatory scheme by reaching agreements to delay 
the introduction of generic drugs to the market.”84  Between 2004 and 
 
 79  Id. 
 80  Id.  The patent cliff is the sharp drop in sales resulting from the loss of patent 
protection.  Carrier, supra note 48, at 1014.   
 81  Carrier, supra note 48, at 1014.  See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (2006). 
 82  Under Paragraph IV certification, a generic competitor can challenge a brand 
name manufacturer’s patent.  If the brand patent is held to be invalid, the generic 
competitor is permitted to begin marketing its product immediately (assuming it 
meets the necessary ANDA requirements), which would promote competition and 
thereby bring down drug prices, which is the goal of the Hatch-Waxman Act.  Pay-for-
delay settlements, however, give the power to the brand name company to determine 
when generics will enter by paying generic competitors to stay out of the market until 
a specified date, despite a potentially invalid patent, which if litigated and found to be 
invalid would allow the generic competitor to enter immediately.  F.T.C., PAY-FOR-
DELAY: HOW DRUG COMPANY PAY-OFFS COST CONSUMERS BILLIONS (2010), 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/pay-delay-how-drug-
company-pay-offs-cost-consumers-billions-federal-trade-commission-staff-
study/100112payfordelayrpt.pdf.   
 83  MARTIN A. VOET, THE GENERIC CHALLENGE: UNDERSTANDING PATENTS, FDA AND 
PHARMACEUTICAL LIFE-CYCLE MANAGEMENT 118 (Brown Walker Press 4th ed. 2014).  See 
discussion infra Section IV.D.   
 84  Pay for Delay, FTC, https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/media-resources/mergers-
competition/pay-delay (last visited Jan. 9, 2017). 
OTT  (DO NOT DELETE) 5/2/2017  1:11 PM 
860 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:849 
2014, there were 215 potential pay for delay settlements between brand 
and generic manufacturers.85  The FTC estimates that these settlements 
add $3.5 billion to drug costs each year.86 
Prior to the landmark FTC v. Actavis decision, there was a circuit 
split regarding the appropriate standard for analyzing pay for delay 
settlements.  The Third Circuit applied the “quick look” test under 
which any payment from a brand name patent holder to the generic 
competitor is presumptively unlawful.87  The Second, Eleventh, and 
D.C. Circuits applied the “scope of the patent” test in which the court 
would determine whether a settlement “alleged that the challenged 
agreements excluded competition to a greater extent than would the 
patent.”88  This approach favored settling disputes that could be 
complicated and expensive to litigate.89 
Then in FTC v. Actavis, the Supreme Court held that the rule of 
reason test applies in reverse settlement cases.90  The majority noted 
that an evaluation of anticompetitive effects may be undertaken 
without examining a patent’s validity.91  Justice Roberts dissented, 
arguing that the scope of the patent test should have been applied.92  
While a bright line rule was not created, the majority articulated five 
considerations for concluding that “reverse payment settlements . . . 
can sometimes violate the antitrust laws.”93  The factors to consider 
include whether: (1) there was a payment; (2) there was a “reverse” 
payment (i.e. payment from the alleged brand patent holder to the 
 
 85  Agreements Filed with the Federal Trade Commission under the Medicare Prescription 
Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Overview of Agreements Filed in FY 2014: 
A Report by the Bureau of Competition, BUREAU OF COMPETITION, FED. TRADE COMMISSION 
Ex. 1 (Jan. 2016), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/agreements-
filled-federal-trade-commission-under-medicare-prescription-drug-
improvement/160113mmafy14rpt.pdf. 
 86  Pay for Delay: When Drug Companies Agree Not to Compete, U.S. FDA, https://www 
.ftc.gov/news-events/media-resources/mergers-competition/pay-delay (last visited 
Feb. 27, 2017).  
 87  In re Effexor XR Antitrust Litig., No. 11-5479, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142206, at 
*57 (D.N.J. Oct. 6, 2014).  
 88  FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2225 (2013). 
 89  Id. at 2234. 
 90  Id. at 2237 (citing Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 759 (1999)) (Noting 
that the exception is for situations where “an observer with even a rudimentary 
understanding of economics could conclude that the arrangements in question would 
have an anticompetitive effect on customers and markets”); Whitney E. Street & Leigh 
E. O’Neil, What Lies Ahead in High Stakes Pay-For-Delay Litigation, BUS. TORTS NEWSL. 
(Spring 2015), https://www.justice.org/sections/newsletters/articles/what-lies-ahead 
-high-stakes-pay-delay-litigation#_ednref3. 
 91  FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. at 2237. 
 92  Id. at 2238 (Roberts, J., dissenting). 
 93  Id. at 2225 
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alleged generic patent infringer); (3) the payment was “large” which 
the Supreme Court considers a “surrogate for a patent’s weakness” and 
a “strong indicator of power—namely, the power to charge prices 
higher than the competitive level”; (4) the large reverse payment was 
“unexplained,” meaning not solely for the cost of litigation, payments 
for other services, or “any other convincing justification”; and (5) the 
parties may still settle in alternative ways, such as “allowing the generic 
manufacturer to enter the patentee’s market before the patent expires 
without the patentee’s paying the challenger to stay out prior to that 
point.”94  The Commissioner of the FTC said that the Commission will 
continue to protect consumers from anticompetitive drug settlements 
that result in higher drug costs.95 
B. Product Hopping 
Another relatively new regulatory gaming practice is product 
hopping.  Product hopping occurs when a “branded manufacturer has 
gamed or manipulated the FDA’s regulatory scheme by 
opportunistically shifting resources to a new FDA-approved drug 
formulation, while, at the same time, withdrawing support for the prior 
formulation that faces imminent competition from generics.”96 
There are two predominant forms of product hopping: a soft 
switch and a hard switch.  In a soft switch, a branded pharmaceutical 
company ceases to market a drug whose patent is about to expire and 
endeavors to convert patients/prescribers to its newer drug that treats 
the same disease or symptoms.97  The company tends to heavily market 
and discount the new drug in order to entice physicians and patients 
to make the switch.98  This practice is considered merely persuasive 
because it never removes a drug approaching the patent cliff from the 
market, so it remains readily available for doctors to prescribe and 
patients to use.99  While drug companies are clearly making an effort 
to push customers toward its newest (and therefore most expensive 
product), the choice remains with the healthcare professional as to 
which of the available options she wishes to prescribe. 
 
 94  Id. at 2236–37. 
 95  Joshua D. Wright, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC v. Actavis and the Future of 
Reverse Payment Cases, Remarks at the Concurrences Journal Annual Dinner (Sept. 26, 
2013) (transcript available at https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ 
public_statements/ftc-v.actavis-future-reverse-payment-cases/130926actavis.pdf). 
 96  Royall et al., supra note 16, at 71. 
 97  New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d 638, 648 (2d Cir. 2015), 
cert. dismissed, 136 S. Ct. 581 (2015). 
 98  Id. at 654. 
 99  Id. at 642. 
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This behavior can eliminate or severely stunt Congress’s intended 
introduction of low cost generic alternatives upon the expiration of the 
brand drug’s patent as articulated in the Hatch-Waxman Act.100  Those 
that oppose product hopping claim that it obliterates the market for 
generic drugs by forcing the “generic essentially back to square one in 
its efforts to deliver FDA-approved equivalents to the marketplace,” 
since it will be unable to rely on DPS laws to bring its low-cost product 
into the hands of patients.101  Brand name manufacturers, conversely, 
claim to simply utilize the FDA and patent approval processes to get 
innovative, new drugs approved and into the market. 
In 2006, the District Court for the District of Columbia heard a 
case in which generic companies alleged that AstraZeneca violated 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act by switching consumers from 
prescription Prilosec, which faced generic competition, to a virtually 
identical drug, Nexium, which did not face generic competition 
because it was protected by a valid patent.102  The District Court viewed 
this conduct as a soft switch and held that the generic company 
plaintiffs failed to identify any antitrust injury because Prilosec 
remained an obtainable option.103  New or improved products should 
not give rise to antitrust liability unless there is proactive 
anticompetitive conduct amounting to coercion.104  Soft switches are 
permissible because while the practice may be seen as persuasive, there 
is no coercion—doctors are not impeded from freely prescribing the 
drugs they believe are most appropriate for their patients. 
Conversely, hard switches or forced switches are deemed coercive 
and are subsequently prohibited.105  In hard switches, brand name 
manufacturers are doing something more than merely introducing a 
new drug into the marketplace—they are removing a previous version 
of a brand drug from the market place and subsequently limiting 
prescriber choice. 106  The court highlights the importance of 
healthcare professionals’ and patients’ (i.e. the marketplace) freedom 
 
 100  Royall et al., supra note 16, at 71. 
 101  Id. 
 102  Walgreen Co. v. AstraZeneca Pharm. L.P., 534 F. Supp. 2d 146, 149 (D.D.C. 
2008). 
 103  Id. at 152. 
 104  Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979). 
 105  New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d 638, 655 (2d Cir. 2015), 
cert. dismissed, 136 S. Ct. 581 (2015). 
 106  Royall et al., supra note 16, at 72–73 (“[The] viability of product-hopping 
antitrust claims turns largely on the strength of the facts, including whether the 
branded manufacturer reinforced its switch to a new product formulation by 
withdrawing the prior formulation from the marketplace and thereby arguably 
limiting consumer choice.”).   
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in deciding which drug is most appropriate via their decision to 
purchase the reformulated or older version of a drug.107 
When a brand name drug is removed from the market and 
replaced by a newer, patent protected version, DPS laws are 
inapplicable to substitute the generic developed for the initial brand 
drug since there is no other AB-rated equivalent drug on the market.  
Without being able to rely on pharmacists’ use of DPS laws to 
introduce generics into the market, generics would need to actively 
market their products to healthcare professionals and patients in order 
to be competitive with brand name drugs.108  Generics are not typically 
present in the minds of prescribers since generic companies do not 
have the same marketing and promotion budgets as brand name 
companies.109  Generics are also able to keep their prices low since they 
do not have to conduct clinical trials under the ANDA process or 
market their products thanks to DPS laws.110  Numerous judges have 
indicated that forcing generics to advertise could increase the cost of 
generic products.111  Furthermore, even if the investment in marketing 
was undertaken, there is “no way to ensure that a pharmacist would 
substitute [that specific company’s generic] product, rather than one 
made by one of its generic competitors.”112 
According to Professor Michael Carrier, reverse settlements can 
have a tremendous effect when combined with the power of product 
hopping.  This lethal combination would “allow[ ] the brand firm to 
methodically move to the new product at a time of its choosing” 
without having to worry about DPS laws or generic substitution.113  The 
FTC’s settlement with Warner Chilcott in 2006 is a useful case study.  
In order to preserve competition for the sale of Ovcon, a widely used 
birth control pill, Warner Chilcott entered into a pay-for-delay 
agreement with Barr for $20 million in order to delay the generic 
version’s market entry for five years.114  During this delay period, 
Warner Chilcott planned a product hop from the older formulation of 
 
 107  Id. 
 108  Id. 
 109  Id. 
 110  Id. 
 111  See In re Suboxone (Buprenorphine Hydrochloride & Naloxone) Antitrust 
Litig., 64 F. Supp. 3d 665, 683–84 (E.D. Pa. 2014); Abbott Labs. v. Teva Pharm. USA, 
Inc., 432 F. Supp. 2d 408, 423 (D. Del. 2006). 
 112  New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis, 787 F.3d 638, 655–56 (2d Cir. 2015), 
cert. dismissed, 136 S. Ct. 581 (2015). 
 113  Carrier, supra note 48, at 1034.   
 114  Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Consumers Win as FTC Action Results in 
Generic Ovcon Launch (Oct. 23, 2006), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-
releases/2006/10/consumers-win-ftc-action-results-generic-ovcon-launch. 
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Ovcon to a new chewable version that had received a new patent.115  
Additionally, Warner Chilcott would cease to sell the older formulation 
of Ovcon in an effort to shift its market to the new, patent-protected 
chewable formulation of the drug.116  This plan would have basically 
prevented any generic competition because DPS law would no longer 
trigger substitution of the older formulation of Ovcon, the new 
chewable version would have patent protection from competitors, and 
generic manufacturers would not yet have had the time to create a new 
generic product of the same bioequivalence as the name brand drug.117 
The FTC threatened to pursue a preliminary injunction that 
would force Warner Chilcott to continue manufacturing the older 
version of Ovcon, despite its looming patent cliff.118  Subsequently, 
Warner Chilcott waived the provision in its agreement with Barr that 
would have delayed the entry of the generic, and Barr began selling 
the generic.119  While this settlement may properly be classified as pay-
for-delay, one could logically assume that if Warner Chilcott 
successfully executed the hard switch during the generic delay, 
patients and physicians would have been less likely to switch to generics 
after the fact.  Combining these two practices could have a substantial 
negative impact on the cost of drugs. 
IV. PRODUCT HOPPING CASES: DECISIONS VARY BY THE DRUG AT ISSUE 
While the same rule of reason framework is used to evaluate the 
actions of brand name pharmaceuticals in each product hopping case, 
the way the test is applied and the resulting analysis varies by court.  
The rule of reason balancing test is applied to weigh the asserted 
procompetitive benefits of the product improvement against the 
alleged anticompetitive effects.120  Procompetitive benefits always 
include product innovation and improvement, while anticompetitive 
effects include a lack of competition resulting in higher drug prices.  
How can product innovation be analyzed?  One method may seek to 
avoid any potential chilling effects on brand name manufacturers’ 
investment in R&D.  Another may be concerned with the level of 
improvement or innovation between drug “hops.”121  In some cases, the 
 
 115  Id. 
 116  Id. 
 117  Id. 
 118  Id. 
 119  Id. 
 120  Royall et al., supra note 16, at 72 (referring to United States v. Microsoft Corp., 
253 F.3d 34, 67 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc)). 
 121  Earlier product redesign cases dealt with questions of improved product 
benefits.  See, e.g., Cal. Computer Prods., Inc. v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 613 F.2d 727, 
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improvements appear minimal (e.g. a trivial change from a capsule to 
tablet), but in other cases (e.g. switching to extended release formula), 
the improvements can be significant for patients in terms of 
adherence.122  The calculus differs according to the judge, drug, and 
relevant market definition.  Defining the relevant market as broad or 
narrow under the Sherman Act analysis is likely to be dispositive. 
A. The Second Circuit: Hard Switches Are Impermissible 
Traditionally, antitrust challenges have come from the FTC,123 
generic competitors,124 or retail pharmacies.125  However, in New York v. 
Actavis, Attorney General Eric. G. Schneiderman brought suit on 
behalf of the State of New York in order “to protect . . .  residents from 
exploitative, anticompetitive business practices.”126  The issue 
presented a case of first impression for the Second Circuit: whether 
Actavis’s decision to engage in product hopping from an older 
formulation of an Alzheimer’s drug to a new, patent protected version 
violates the Sherman Act.127 
 
744 (9th Cir. 1979) (IBM “was under no duty to help . . . other peripheral equipment 
manufacturers survive or expand” and “IBM need not . . . have constricted its product 
development so as to facilitate sales of rival products”); Allied Orthopedic Appliances 
Inc. v. Tyco Health Care Grp., 592 F.3d 991, 1000 (9th Cir. 2010) (“To weigh the 
benefits of an improved product design against the resulting injuries to competitors is 
not just unwise, it is unadministrable. There are no criteria that courts can use to 
calculate the ‘right’ amount of innovation, which would maximize social gains and 
minimize competitive injury.”).  Contra United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 
65 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (holding that Microsoft redesign was anticompetitive because 
there were no commercial justifications other than exclusion of rival products).   
 122  Ernest R. Berndt et al., The Impact of Incremental Innovation in Biopharmaceuticals, 
24 PHARMAECONOMICS 69, 71 (2006) (“[I]nnovation that takes the form of improved 
formulations, delivery methods and dosing protocols may also generate substantial 
benefits associated with improved patient compliance, greater efficacy as a result of 
improved pharmacokinetics, reduced adverse effects or the ability to effectively treat 
new patient populations.”); Joshua D. Wright, Comm’r, U.S. Fed. Trade Comm’n & 
Judge Douglas H. Ginsburg, Comments on the Canadian Competition Bureau’s Draft 
Updated Intellectual Property Enforcement Guidelines 2 (Aug. 10, 2015), 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/734661/150810ca
nadacomment.pdf. 
 123  See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Consumers Win as FTC Action Results 
in Generic Ovcon Launch (Oct. 23, 2006), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-
releases/2006/10/consumers-win-ftc-action-results-generic-ovcon-launch. 
 124  See Mylan Pharms., Inc. v. Warner Chilcott Pub. Ltd. Co., No. 12-3824, 2015 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 50026, at *47 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 16, 2015).  
 125  Walgreen Co. v. AstraZeneca Pharm. L.P., 534 F. Supp. 2d 146, 146 (D.D.C. 
2008). 
 126  Complaint at 5, New York v. Actavis PLC, No. 14 Civ. 7374, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
172918 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 11, 2014).  
 127  New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d 638, 643 (2d Cir. 2015), 
cert. dismissed, 136 S. Ct. 581 (2015). 
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New York alleged that Actavis would unfairly profit from 
vulnerable Alzheimer’s patients “by interfering with patients’ and 
doctors’ abilities to choose the course of treatment that they feel is 
most appropriate and cost-effective.”128  New York sought a preliminary 
injunction to prevent Actavis from limiting access to an outdated 
version of the Alzheimer’s drug, which would have the effect of 
limiting the generic version’s market entry.129  The District Court 
granted New York’s prayer for relief.130 
In its Sherman Act analysis, the Court had to determine whether 
Actavis had monopoly power in the relevant market and willfully 
acquired or maintained that power.  When examining the relevant 
market, it is necessary to determine what class of drugs is involved.  
Actavis created Namenda IR, which was approved to treat moderate to 
severe Alzheimer’s in January 2004.131  The drug was formulated to 
release immediately and therefore had to be administered to patients 
twice-daily.132  Actavis later created Namenda XR, which was approved 
in June 2010 and entered the market in 2013.133  Namenda XR is a slow 
release drug and consequently only needs to be taken once-daily.134  
Both Namenda IR and XR have “the same active ingredient and 
therapeutic effect;” the most relevant change between the drugs is the 
how often the prescription needs to be taken (i.e. twice a day versus 
once a day).135  Importantly, these two Namenda products are the only 
ones available in the memantine N-Methyl D-Aspartate (“NMDA”) 
class.136  Therefore, there are no other bioequivalents that can be 
substituted using DPS laws. 
Some commentators have argued that the only plausible motive 
for making a product change without an obvious improvement is to 
prevent competition for longer than the twenty year patent allows.137  
However, others contend that there is real value in innovative drugs 
(e.g. creating an extended release/once a day drug for a population 
suffering from memory loss, which is likely to increase adherence since 
 
 128  Complaint at 30, New York v. Actavis PLC, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 172918. 
 129  New York v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d at 643. 
 130  Id. at 649. 
 131  Id. at 646–47. 
 132  Id. at 647.  
 133  Id. 
 134  Id. 
 135  New York v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d at 647. 
 136  Id. 
 137  Brief Supporting Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 40, at 12 (internal citation 
omitted).   
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there are less opportunities to forget taking the medication).138  
Regardless of the academic debate, the majority was unconcerned with 
whether the drug was unique or innovative in New York v. Actavis.139 
The court next looked to the intent of the drug company, which 
arguably was to avoid the patent cliff and continue profiting on its 
slightly reformulated brand name drug.  Namenda IR’s patent was set 
to expire on July 11, 2015.140  Five generic versions of Namenda IR were 
set to enter the market at that time, while Namenda XR was protected 
until 2029.141  Actavis, like many other companies that preceded it, 
desired to avoid the patent cliff and ensuing losses.142  Therefore, two 
years prior to Namenda IR’s patent expiration, Actavis stopped actively 
marketing Namenda IR and focused its attention on Namenda XR.143  
Both drugs were still available for physicians to prescribe and 
pharmacists to dispense, making it a soft switch.144 
However, after a few months Actavis decided to take more 
extreme action after its “internal projections estimated that only 30% 
of Namenda IR users would voluntarily switch” to Namenda XR before 
Namenda IR reached the patent cliff.145  Actavis subsequently only 
offered Namenda IR by mail-order pharmacy if it was medically 
necessary; a population which was estimated to comprise only about 
3% of current users.146 
The District Court determined that removing Namenda IR from 
the market before the generics entered would leave patients with no 
option but to switch to Namenda XR, as it was the only other drug 
available in that class to treat this stage of Alzheimer’s since generic IR 
 
 138  V. Nunes et al., Clinical Guidelines and Evidence Review for Medicines Adherence: 
Involving Patients in Decisions About Prescribed Medicines and Supporting Adherence, 
NATIONAL COLLABORATING CENTRE FOR PRIMARY CARE 209–10 (2009), 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK55440/pdf/Bookshelf_NBK55440.pdf. 
(The study found that making patients’ drug regimens easier to follow (e.g. reducing 
the amount of pills that need to be taken) may be beneficial for increasing adherence, 
“but the quality of evidence was low”). 
 139  The majority discusses superior product redesign in Berkey Photo, but fails to 
apply that framework to the case at hand.  New York v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d at 652–54. 
 140  Id. at 647. 
 141  Id. 
 142  Id. 
 143  Id. at 648 (Actavis “spent substantial sums of money promoting XR to doctors, 
caregivers, patients, and pharmacists” and “sold XR at a discounted rate, making it 
considerably less expensive than Namenda IR tablets, and issued rebates to health 
plans to ensure that patients did not have to pay higher co-payments for XR than for 
IR”). 
 144  New York v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d at 648. 
 145  Id. 
 146  Id. 
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would not be therapeutically equivalent to Namenda XR according to 
the FDA.147  Without being able to utilize DPS laws, which would 
automatically trigger a switch to one of the generic versions of 
Namenda IR, generics would essentially have no impact on the 
Namenda market, because generic manufacturers typically rely on DPS 
laws and do not market the drugs to healthcare professionals and 
patients.  The District Court deemed this an impermissible hard switch 
and issued the state’s requested preliminary injunction requiring that 
Namenda IR remain on the market until thirty days after the generic 
versions of Namenda IR were released into the market.148 
On appeal, the Second Circuit rejected the brand manufacturer’s 
argument that the generic drug makers should be required to market 
its version of the drug in order to compete with brand name 
manufacturers.149  The court noted that in order “[f]or there to be an 
antitrust violation, generics need not be barred from ‘all means of 
distribution’ if they are ‘bar[red] . . .  from the cost-efficient ones.’”150  
The cost-efficient mechanism referred to is state drug substitution laws.  
Some commentators have categorized this decision as effectively 
creating a duty to aid a competitor, which generally is not required.151 
Actavis filed a petition to the Supreme Court appealing the 
Second Circuit’s decision.152  The issue challenged was “whether the 
Sherman Act requires drugmakers to keep selling older drugs for the 
benefit of state drug substitution laws and competitors’ profits . . . [and 
whether] the Second Circuit erred by requiring the company to 
‘maximize’ the sales of generic rivals by continuing to sell a medication 
it considers outdated.”153  Actavis contended that there is no precedent 
for instituting a duty to aid competitors.154  It further argued “that 
antitrust law cannot be used to enforce other types of regulations and 
that state laws should not determine how to apply a federal statute such 
 
 147  Id. at 649. 
 148  Id. at 649–50. 
 149  New York v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d at 656. 
 150  Id. at 656 (quoting United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 64 (D.C. Cir. 
2001)). 
 151  Refusal to Deal, FED. TRADE COMMISSION, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-
advice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/single-firm-conduct/refusal-deal 
(last visited Feb. 26, 2017).  
 152  New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis, 787 F.3d 638 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. 
dismissed, 136 S. Ct. 581 (2015).  
 153  Kevin Penton, High Court Urged To Weigh In On Drug ‘Product-Hopping’, Law360 
(Nov. 6, 2015, 11:00 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/724581/high-court-
urged-to-weigh-in-on-drug-product-hopping. 
 154  Id. 
OTT  (DO NOT DELETE) 5/2/2017  1:11 PM 
2017] COMMENT 869 
as the Sherman Act.”155  The Supreme Court dismissed the petition.156  
It is unclear at this time whether the Supreme Court agrees with the 
Second Circuit’s decision or if it is waiting for a circuit split, potentially 
arising from an upcoming Third Circuit case discussed below. 
B. The Third Circuit: Differing District Court Decisions Below 
Two recent product hopping cases in the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania reached opposite conclusions.157  They involved different 
drugs for vastly different conditions, different size generic and brand 
manufacturers, and were decided by different judges. 
1. In re Suboxone Antitrust Litigation: In Agreement with the 
Second Circuit 
The plaintiffs in In re Suboxone are the direct purchasers and the 
end payors of Suboxone.158  The defendant, Reckitt Benckiser, Inc., 
announced that it was removing Suboxone tablets from the market 
several months prior to generic approval and did actually remove the 
tablets from the market within a few weeks of generic entry.159 
The District Court defined the relevant market as “a products’ 
reasonable interchangeability of use or cross-elasticity of demand 
between the product and its substitutes.”160  Reasonable 
interchangeability contemplates how similar two products are by 
looking at price, use, and qualities.161  Cross-elasticity is a measure of 
the change in demand caused by a price increase for similar goods 
within the relevant product market.162  Suboxone is a product for 
“maintenance treatment for patients suffering from opioid 
addiction.”163  It is the sole drug currently on the market that can be 
used by a patient in her home (as opposed to administration by a 
healthcare professional in an office setting).164  The Court held that the 
 
 155  Id. 
 156  New York v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d at 638.  
 157  In re Suboxone (Buprenorphine Hydrochloride & Naloxone) Antitrust Litig., 
64 F. Supp. 3d 665, 672 (E.D. Pa. 2014) (holding that plaintiffs’ Sherman Act claims 
survived the motion to dismiss); Mylan Pharms., Inc. v. Warner Chilcott Pub. Ltd. Co., 
No. 12-3824, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50026, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 16, 2015) (granting 
Warner Chilcott’s motion for summary judgment). 
 158  In re Suboxone, 64 F. Supp. 3d at 672. 
 159  Id. at 674. 
 160  Id. at 712 (quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962)).  
 161  Id. at 712–13. 
 162  Tunis Bros. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 952 F.2d 715, 722 (3d Cir. 1991). 
 163  In re Suboxone, 64 F. Supp. 3d at 672–73. 
 164  Id. 
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plaintiffs’ claim that the relevant market should be limited only to 
Suboxone and its bioequivalents (i.e. only drugs that can be 
substituted using DPS laws) was sufficient to survive a motion to 
dismiss.165 
Here, the narrow market definition combined with the hard 
switch (i.e. the defendant’s removal of the older formulation of the 
drug and the introduction of the newer formulation) was deemed 
anticompetitive.  The defendant’s product hop had the potential to 
foreclose healthcare professional and patient autonomy by forcing a 
switch.166  Furthermore, the court held that without other AB-rated 
drugs on the market, drug substitution laws could not be used and 
generic drug companies were unable to “efficiently compete” with the 
brand name manufacturer of Suboxone.167  The plaintiffs’ Sherman 
Act claims therefore survived the defendant’s motion to dismiss.168 
2. Mylan v. Warner Chilcott: Stands in Contrast to the Second Circuit’s 
Decision 
The plaintiff in this case, Mylan, is “the third-largest generic 
pharmaceutical company in the world,” with $6.13 billion in revenue 
in 2011.169  The defendants are Mayne (only six products; $50.1 million 
in sales) and Warner Chilcott (“$2.7 billion in revenue in 2011, 93% 
of which came from eight products”).170  Both of the defendants, which 
are brand name drug companies, are smaller than the plaintiff, which 
is a generic manufacturer.  Mylan argued that the defendants have 
monopoly power under Section 2 of the Sherman Act.171  In order to 
succeed, Mylan had to prove that Warner Chilcott did in fact have 
monopoly power over the relevant market and that the company 
willfully acquired or maintained that power.172 
When determining the relevant market, courts look to the type of 
drug at issue.  Here “Doryx [is] the branded version of delayed-release 
 
 165  Id. at 713. 
 166  Jonathan H. Hatch & Robert P. LoBue, Court Allows “Product Hopping” Claims to 
Proceed in Suboxone Litigation Based on Allegations of Removal of Prior Formulation and 
Disparagement of Generic Competition, ANTITRUST UPDATE (Dec. 8, 2014), 
http://www.antitrustupdateblog.com/blog/court-allows-product-hopping-claims-to-
proceed-in-suboxone-litigation/. 
 167  Id. 
 168  In re Suboxone, 64 F. Supp. 3d at 672. 
 169  Mylan Pharms., Inc. v. Warner Chilcott Pub. Ltd. Co., No. 12-3824, 2015 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 50026, at *5–6 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 16, 2015). 
 170  Id.  
 171  Id.  
 172  Id.  
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doxycycline hyclate, a prescription antibiotic used primarily to treat 
severe acne.”173  At the District Court level, Judge Diamond noted that 
dermatologists agree “that all oral tetracyclines treat acne with similar 
effectiveness and so are interchangeable for that purpose” and further 
that “Doryx is but one of a class of antibiotics used to treat acne.”174  For 
example, Blue Cross Blue Shield of Illinois lists various Doxycycline 
products in the same preauthorization category as Minocycline 
products.175  “Doxycycline in oral capsules, oral tablets, and oral 
suspension and minocycline in oral capsules, oral tablets, and 
extended-release tablets are available as AB-rated generics.”176  As 
further evidence that the relevant market is broader than merely 
Doxycycline, Mylan continually classified various tetracyclines in the 
“Same/Similar” product category in internal analyses.177  The District 
Court therefore determined that the relevant market included other 
oral tetracyclines.178  Using a broad market definition, the defendants’ 
18% slice of the market was determined not to be predominant.179  This 
market definition stands in stark contrast to the Actavis and In re 
Suboxone cases where the market was limited to a single drug and its 
bioequivalents. 
When analyzing cross-elasticity in this case, the defendant’s 
conduct was not symptomatic of a monopoly because “when 
Defendants increased the price of Doryx, its sales decreased and the 
sales of other oral tetracyclines increased.”180  This fact informs the 
courts that other products were readily substituted for Doryx when its 
price became unreasonable.181  While one particular company may be 
harmed by alleged anticompetitive conduct, it has not been legally 
injured as long as the broader market for the product has not been 
harmed.182 
 
 173  Id. at *5. 
 174  Id. at *26. 
 175  Acne Antibiotics Prior Authorization Criteria, BLUE CROSS BLUE SHIELD ILL. 1 (Feb. 
2011), http://www.bcbsil.com/pdf/pharmacy/rx_criteria/acne_antibiotics.pdf. 
 176  Id. at 4; see also Orange Book: Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence 
Evaluations, U.S. FDA (Feb. 2016), http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/ob/ 
docs/temptn.cfm (Proprietary Name Search Results from ‘OB_Rx’ table for query on 
‘Doxycycline’). 
 177  Mylan, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50026, at *27. 
 178  Id. at *30. 
 179  Id.  
 180  Id. at *28 (“Pay no more” cards to cut the price of drug as part of a marketing 
effort). 
 181  Mylan Pharms. Inc. v. Warner Chilcott Pub. Ltd. Co., 838 F.3d 421 (3d Cir. 
2016). 
 182  Mylan, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50026, at *20 (citing Eichorn v. AT&T Corp., 248 
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Warner Chilcott asserted “that antitrust law does not impose a 
duty on brand firms to promote outdated formulations, such that 
generic manufacturers may take advantage of automatic substitution 
laws.”183  Unlike other product hopping cases that have cited Congress’s 
intent to further the promotion of generic drugs, the District Court 
did the exact opposite and took issue with generics “free-riding” on 
brand name manufacturer’s investment in research and development 
and marketing.184  Judge Diamond explained that the Hatch-Waxman 
Act does not discuss product hopping and therefore Congress is 
knowingly allowing the practice to continue.185  He believes that “The 
Sherman Act protects competition, not competitors.”186  Therefore, the 
“[d]efendants have no duty to facilitate Mylan’s business plan by 
keeping older versions of branded Doryx on the market.”187  Amici 
argued that requiring a brand name drug to continue manufacturing 
an outdated version of the drug would increase costs for all 
stakeholders, including the brand manufacturer that has to continue 
to manufacture and ship the drug and pharmacies that need to house 
and dispense the drug.188 
Judge Diamond consequently granted Warner Chilcott’s motion 
for summary judgment.189  In particular, Judge Diamond suggested that 
Warner Chilcott had other avenues available to stay competitive with 
brand manufacturers besides state generic substitution laws, such as 
advertising and marketing.190  Again, this is in direct contrast with many 
other judges, public officials, and scholars who claim that promoting 
generics in such an expensive manner is unlikely to be effective since 
 
F.3d 131, 140 (3d Cir. 2001)). 
 183  Vikram Iyengar, Mylan v. Warner Chilcott: A Study in Pharmaceutical Product 
Hopping, 19 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 245, 261 (2015) (citing Memorandum of Law 
in Support of Defendant Warner Chilcott’s Motion to Dismiss at 16, Mylan Pharms., 
Inc. v. Warner Chilcott Pub. Ltd. Co., No. 12-3824, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50026, at *5–
6 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 16, 2015) (“Plaintiffs argue that Defendants owed Mylan a duty to 
continue marketing older versions of Doryx, so that Mylan’s generic Doryx could be 
automatically substituted for Doryx prescriptions and Mylan would take the sale.”)). 
 184  Mylan, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50026, at *48. 
 185  Id. at *44. 
 186  Id. at *19 (internal citations omitted). 
 187  Id. at *40 (citing Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 
540 U.S. 398, 415 (2004) (discussing how there is no general duty to aid competitors)).   
 188  Brief for Business and Policy Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellees 
at 13, Mylan Pharms., Inc. v. Warner Chilcott Pub. Ltd. Co., No. 12-3824, 2015 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 50026 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 16, 2015), http://cbpp.georgetown.edu/sites/cbpp 
.georgetown.edu/files/Doryx%20Amicus%20Brief.pdf. 
 189  Mylan, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50026, at *5. 
 190  Brief for Federal Trade Commission Supporting Petitioner-Appellant, supra 
note 40, at 12. 
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there is no guarantee that a pharmacist will dispense a particular 
generic manufacturer’s specific product over another generic drug 
since the resulting decrease in price and subsequent savings will result 
regardless of which generic brand was substituted.191  The FTC believes 
that if generic companies were forced to market their drugs in order 
to stay competitive with brand manufacturers, the result would be 
higher generic drug prices,192 which would undermine Hatch-
Waxman’s intended purpose. 
Perhaps Judge Diamond’s decision and analysis varied from the 
aforementioned cases because in Mylan, the plaintiff was a much more 
profitable enterprise than the defendants.193  Additionally, after the 
defendant, Warner Chilcott, stopped producing 75 and 100 mg Doryx 
tablets, Mylan became the only manufacturer of these dosages and 
subsequently raised the prices to “higher than Defendants’ last 
reported prices.”194  Mylan’s conduct seems to be squarely in contrast 
with Congress’s intent to introduce generics as less expensive 
alternatives.  Judge Diamond’s decision may reflect the fact that the 
generic manufacturer was more profitable and priced the generic 
higher than the brand name drug. 
On appeal to the Third Circuit, the FTC filed an amicus brief 
claiming that the lower court erred in its decision because it believed 
“that Doryx is therapeutically similar to other antibiotics.”195  The FTC 
had previously advocated for a “quick look” standard that would allow 
a court to hold a company liable without undertaking a nuanced 
factual inquiry and the Supreme Court twice rejected it.196  The FTC 
claims that the Eastern District of Pennsylvania “effectively embraces a 
rule of nearly per se legality for product-hopping conduct.”197  The FTC 
takes issue with the per se legality or scope of the patent standard 
 
 191  “[A]dditional expenditures by generics on marketing would be impractical and 
ineffective because a generic manufacturer promoting a product would have no way 
to ensure that a pharmacist would substitute its product, rather than one made by one 
of its generic competitors.”  New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d 
638, 656 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. dismissed, 136 S. Ct. 581 (2015). 
 192  Brief for Federal Trade Commission Supporting Petitioner-Appellant, supra 
note 40, at 5. 
 193  Mylan, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50026, at *20. 
 194  Id. at *14. 
 195  Brief for Federal Trade Commission Supporting Petitioner-Appellant, supra 
note 40, at 12. 
 196  See, e.g., Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756 (1999); FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 
S. Ct. 2223 (2013). 
 197  Brief for Federal Trade Commission Supporting Petitioner-Appellant, supra 
note 40, at 21.  This juxtaposes the FTC’s mission to protect the consumer if Mylan in 
fact charged more than the brand name manufacturer. 
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because it favors settlements in the face of potentially costly, 
complicated litigation.198  The FTC likely believes that such a standard 
would permit product hopping, thereby harming competition and the 
public. 
The Third Circuit, however, affirmed the lower court’s decision 
against the wishes of the FTC.  It refused to use Mylan’s narrow market 
definition and instead agreed with the broader market definition used 
by the District Court, which was comprised of other oral tetracyclines 
prescribed to treat acne.199  Under the broad definition, the 
defendants’ market share slice was not large enough to constitute 
antitrust liability.200 
The Third Circuit further agreed that the rule of reason was the 
proper framework to use.201  While the Third Circuit did not specifically 
use the words “uniqueness” or “improvements” when analyzing the 
product hops, which the Second Circuit deemed irrelevant in the 
Actavis case, the Third Circuit discussed the reasons for the new patent 
application and said they were non-pretextual,202 implying the 
motivation for the product hop was not solely to maintain its profits 
from its original patent.  Additionally, the Third Circuit noted that the 
lower court held there was no duty to aid a competitor, but the Third 
Circuit did not delve further into this issue in its analysis because it was 
not like the Actavis case since there were already generic competitors 
in the market.203  The Third Circuit distinguished the facts in this case 
from those in the Second Circuit Actavis decision because there was no 
patent cliff and 180-day generic exclusivity advantage at stake (which 
would bar generic competitors from entering the market).204 
The Third Circuit left open the possibility that “certain 
insignificant design or formula changes, combined with other coercive 
conduct, could present a closer call with respect to establishing liability 
in future cases.”205  It enumerated a list of potential factors for future 
courts to balance in such cases, using a fact-specific analysis.206  The 
 
 198  FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. at 2234. 
 199  Mylan Pharms. Inc. v. Warner Chilcott Pub. Ltd. Co., 838 F.3d 421, 436–37 (3d 
Cir. 2016). 
 200  Id.   
 201  Id. at 438.   
 202  Id. at 439. 
 203  Mylan, 838 F.3d 421 at 438. 
 204  Id. at 439–40. 
 205  Id. at 440. 
 206  Factors include:  
balanc[ing] the important public interest in encouraging innovation in 
the pharmaceutical industry with our obligations to protect consumers 
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Third Circuit said courts must balance “the important public interest 
in encouraging innovation in the pharmaceutical industry with our 
obligations to protect consumers and to ensure fair competition under 
the antitrust laws.”207  Additionally, courts must be “wary both of 
second-guessing Congress’s legislative judgment and of turning courts 
into tribunals over innovation sufficiency.”208  Lastly, courts need to be 
aware of the unique divide between patients and pharmaceutical 
manufacturers, “especially in cases where there is evidence of extreme 
coercion of physician prescribing decisions or blatant 
misrepresentation about a generic manufacturer’s version of a drug.”209 
C. The Importance of Defining the Relevant Market and Why the Size of 
the Market Varies Depending upon the Drug at Issue 
One of the major differences in product hopping cases is the kind 
of drugs involved.  The seriousness of the disease and availability of 
alternatives seems to have a dramatic effect on the outcome of the case.  
Namenda, for example, is the only class of drugs exclusively approved 
to treat moderate to severe Alzheimer’s.210  Alzheimer’s patients are 
particularly vulnerable because they tend to be dependent on their 
caretakers, as the disease makes people lost, confused, or forgetful, and 
those afflicted require constant assistance with basic tasks and personal 
care.211 
Similarly, Suboxone is a drug for the maintenance treatment of 
opioid dependence.  It is a good treatment option for those recovering 
from “short-acting opioids, like heroin or prescription painkillers.”212  
It is the only drug of its kind that can be taken by the patient in her 
own home; “all other opioid addiction maintenance treatments, such 
 
and to ensure fair competition under the antitrust laws; . . . Congress’s 
legislative judgment and of turning courts into tribunals over innovation 
sufficiency; . . . [and the] unique separation between consumers and 
drug manufacturers in the pharmaceutical market, especially in cases 
where there  is evidence of extreme coercion of physician prescribing 
decisions or blatant misrepresentation about a generic manufacturer’s 
version of a drug. 
Id. at 440–41.   
 207  Id.  
 208  Id. 
 209  Id. at 440–41. 
 210  FDA-approved Treatments for Alzheimer’s, ALZHEIMER’S ASS’N 3 (Feb. 2016), 
http://www.alz.org/dementia/downloads/topicsheet_treatments.pdf. 
 211  Basics of Alzheimer’s Disease: What It Is and What You Can Do, ALZHEIMER’S ASS’N 
15–16 (2015), http://www.alz.org/national/documents/brochure_basicsofalz_low. 
pdf. 
 212  Treatment with Suboxone Film, SUBOXONE, http://www.suboxone.com/medical-
treatment (last visited Feb. 21, 2016).   
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as methadone, can only be dispensed at a clinic.”213  There is great value 
in a patient not having to travel to a physician’s office.  For example, it 
frees up the doctor’s schedule to treat other patients, and it allows for 
a patient to gain independence and not have to travel to an office for 
treatment.  One can imagine the value to patients, their families, and 
healthcare professionals in helping these patients fight their addiction 
and regain a normal lifestyle. 
In both cases, it is logical that a narrow market definition was used 
considering the unique characteristics of the drugs at issue.  In the 
Mylan case, however, Doryx is one of many types of treatment for acne.  
This case is distinguishable because the drug at issue was not the only 
one approved for the specific indication.  Here, dermatologists agreed 
that all oral tetracyclines were interchangeable in treating severe 
acne.214  Furthermore, unlike Alzheimer’s and opioid dependence, 
acne is not a debilitating disease that affects family dynamics and 
caregivers.  Since acne can be more easily studied than Alzheimer’s or 
addiction, a greater number of drug companies are able to create 
products for acne treatment because the R&D costs are lower. 
One of the issues that has emerged is whether there is a duty to 
aid competitors.  Generics “are largely at the mercy of their branded 
competitors, whose continued support for the branded version of the 
relevant drug is essentially a prerequisite for successful generic 
entry.”215  Generic companies are undoubtedly successful because of 
state substitution laws.  The overwhelming majority of generic drugs 
are dramatically lower in cost than brand name drugs.216  Generics do 
not have to expend millions of dollars in R&D, marketing, and efforts 
toward detailing healthcare professionals.  However, if a brand 
manufacturer strategically decides to remove an older formulation of 
a drug, courts may force the brand name company to keep the older 
formulation on the market until generics are able to successfully enter 
the market and ideally stimulate competition and lower prices.217  
Researchers suggest that it is only after four generic products are on 
the market that the prices of generic drugs drop.218  Is the opposite true 
 
 213  In re Suboxone (Buprenorphine Hydrochloride & Naloxone) Antitrust Litig., 
64 F. Supp. 3d 665, 673 (E.D. Pa. 2014). 
 214  Mylan, 838 F.3d 421 at 436. 
 215  Royall et al., supra note 16, at 71. 
 216  U.S. FDA, supra note 22 (“On average, the cost of a generic drug is 80 to 85 
percent lower than the brand name product.”). 
 217  See, e.g., New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d 638, 650 (2d 
Cir. 2015), cert. dismissed, 136 S. Ct. 581 (2015). 
 218  Suzanne McGee, Investigating the Mystery of Soaring Generic Medication Prices, THE 
GUARDIAN (Oct. 11, 2015, 8:00 PM) http://www.theguardian.com/money/us-money-
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and generic prices increase as manufacturers leave the market? 
In Mylan v. Warner Chilcott, Mylan became the only manufacturer 
of a particular drug and it raised drug prices since there was no 
competition to keep prices low, despite the fact that it was a generic 
company and it is ordinarily presumed that generic prices are lower 
than brand prices.219  Therefore, there is no guarantee that using drug 
substitution laws to introduce more generic drugs into the market will 
keep drugs prices low, particularly when generic companies are 
strategically buying older generic drugs that have lost competition over 
the years, freeing companies to raise prices.220  As additional support 
for this notion, the National Community Pharmacist Association 
undertook a study in which over “1,000 members [ ] reported instances 
of generic drugs that had spiked by as much as 600%, 1000%, and even 
2000%.”221  Over three quarters of the respondents reported twenty-six 
or more instances of spikes in generic drug prices.222 
What should be done in response?  If Congress is aware of generic 
manufacturers’ ability to reap such large profits, why are they choosing 
not to amend legislation to alter their preference for generics?  There 
is a distinction between natural and forced monopolies.  Natural 
monopolies occur when generic companies leave the market 
voluntarily after a number of years once the market is no longer 
lucrative, which allows the remaining generic companies to raise their 
prices due to a lack of competition.  Forced monopolies arise when a 
brand manufacturer attempts to preserve its profits in the form of 
patent-extending strategies, which prevents potential generic 
competitors from ever entering the market.  The FTC is relatively 
helpless to intervene when companies exploit monopolies that 
developed naturally. 223  However, in light of the recent rise in generic 
prices on older drugs facing a lack of competition (usually identified 
by hedge fund managers seeking ways to maximize profits without 
 
blog/2015/oct/11/generic-medication-prices-mystery (quoting Aaron Kesselheim). 
 219  Mylan Pharms., Inc. v. Warner Chilcott Pub. Ltd., No. 12-3824, 2015 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 50026, at *48 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 16, 2015); 
 220  Former hedge fund manager Martin Shkreli raised the cost per pill of a drug 
from $13 to $750.  McGee, supra note 218.   
 221  Why Are Some Generic Drugs Skyrocketing in Price? Hearing Before the S. Comm. on 
Primary Health and Aging, Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor & Pensions, U.S. HEALTH, EDUC., 
LAB. AND PENSIONS COMMITTEE 2 (2014), http://www.help.senate.gov/imo/media 
/doc/Frankil.pdf (statement of Rob Frankil, Independent Pharmacist and Member of 
the National Community Pharmacists Association (NCPA)). 
 222  Id. 
 223  Elisabeth Rosenthal, Rapid Price Increases for Some Generic Drugs Catch Users by 
Surprise, N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/09/health/ 
some-generic-drug-prices-are-soaring.html. 
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injecting funding into R&D), should these situations be treated the 
same?  To date, the FTC has not forced manufacturers who wish to 
leave the market once it is no longer profitable to continue producing 
a drug in order to keep generic prices low in natural monopolies.  Yet 
the FTC has in effect created a duty for brand name manufacturers to 
aid competitors by requiring them to continue producing drugs that 
are no longer profitable until generics can be introduced into the 
market to stimulate competition.224  In both kinds of monopolies, the 
goal is to maximize profits, yet they are treated differently.  Companies 
in both cases appear to lack beneficent intentions so perhaps they 
should be treated similarly going forward. 
While the FDA does not involve itself with questions of anti-
competitive conduct, it made a beneficial step for healthcare 
professionals, patients, and insurers, by announcing in March 2016 
that it “will expedite a generic drug review if there’s only one 
manufacturer.”225  FDA spokeswoman Sandy Walsh said this policy 
change could push the review of about 125 generic drugs up in the 
pipeline.226  However, the announcement falls short of being a total 
solution to the generic price problem because the FDA will only 
intervene if there is a potential drug shortage—not in the event of 
price increases resulting from a monopoly.227  Despite the stated 
purpose of the policy change, it will have the incidental effect of 
controlling prices because there will be 125 fewer drug companies that 
are able to inflate generic drug prices due to a lack of competition.  
Understandably, competition is not the FDA’s domain,228 but it is the 
only agency responsible for drug review, so this policy change is an 
important move in the right direction. 
 
 
 224  I was unable to locate any instances in which the FTC filed a lawsuit or had 
arranged a settlement requiring a drug manufacturer that wished to exit the market 
to remain producing a drug in order to prevent a natural monopoly.   
 225  Anna Edney, Shkreli’s Strategy to Jack Up Drug Prices May Be Curbed by FDA, 
BLOOMBERG BNA PHARMACEUTICAL L. & INDUSTRY REP. 405 (Mar. 14, 2016), 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/OfficeofMedicalProduct
sandTobacco/CDER/ManualofPoliciesProcedures/UCM407849.pdf?source=govdeli
very&utm_medium=email&utm_source=govdelivery (referring to Center for Drug 
Evaluation and Research, Manual of Policies and Procedures, MAPP 5240.3 Rev. 2: 
Office of Generic Drugs, Prioritization of the Review of Original ANDAs, Amendments, and 
Supplements). 
 226  Edney, supra note 225, at 405. 
 227  Id.  
 228  That is up to the FTC, Department of Justice, or the Office of the Inspector 
General.  
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D. What Additional Measures Can Be Taken to Keep Generic Drug 
Prices Low? 
Comparative effectiveness research offers a potential vehicle for 
savings, particularly in light of the rise of electronic health records229 
and Congress’s support for the Patient-Centered Outcomes Research 
Institute (PCORI).230  However, comparative effectiveness will require 
many different stakeholders to come together to create a cohesive and 
workable system. 
Is Judge Diamond right that there are alternate ways to urge 
patients and prescribers to choose a less expensive drug than through 
DPS laws?  Nudges like pre-authorization, approved drug lists from 
insurance companies or pharmacy benefit managers, step programs, 
and formularies are designed to facilitate the selection of cheaper 
drugs.231  These tools force doctors and patients alike to make 
conscious decisions about the drug being chosen and the ramifications 
such decisions will have on prices.232  If these strategies do not result in 
significant savings, we should ask why this is such a common practice 
that impedes patients/insureds from receiving the treatment they 
need in a timely fashion. It would then also seem to be a waste of 
administrative time that will then actually make health care costs rise. 
What remains unclear is whether these measures could result in 
the cost savings that have historically resulted from the use of generics.  
Can insurance companies and pharmacy benefit managers actively 
implement measures that keep prices low?  The answer is that without 
the Hatch-Waxman Act creating the ANDA and public policy favoring 
low-cost generics, probably not.  The biggest issue moving forward is 
what can further be done to limit costs, without inhibiting drug 
innovation.  The health care system is often fragmented for the sake of 
administrative simplicity—regulating drugs, health plans, healthcare 
professionals, and hospitals individually in order for information to be 
palatable; as opposed to, for example, regulating drugs in such a way 
that takes into account how high drug prices will lead to higher 
insurance costs and therefore patient premiums.  However, an 
 
 229  William R. Hersh et al., Recommendations for the Use of Operational EHR Data in 
Comparative Effectiveness Research, EGEMS (Generating Evidence & Methods to improve 
patient outcomes) 1 (Oct. 2013), http://repository.edm-forum.org/cgi/viewcontent 
.cgi?article=1018&context=egems. 
 230  About Us, PATIENT-CENTERED OUTCOMES RES. INST. (Oct. 6, 2014), http://www. 
pcori.org/about-us. 
 231  New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d 638, 655 (2d Cir. 2015), 
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integrated system that looks at the health care system in its totality has 
the potential to create innovative solutions to the problem of rising 
health care costs. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Hatch-Waxman Act took positive steps to introduce a greater 
number of generic drugs into the market and subsequently lower 
consumer and taxpayer costs.  However, the evolution of regulatory 
gaming practices, such as reverse payment settlements and product 
hopping, demonstrate that the Hatch-Waxman system is far from 
perfect.  Like the health care system generally, the system for patents 
and market exclusivity are complicated and ripe for manipulation.  
The product hopping cases discussed illustrate the complexity of 
considerations undertaken by courts when evaluating the legality of 
such conduct including cost, patient choice, competition, type of drug 
and disease at issue, and the relevant market.  Even if product hopping 
is eventually heard and resolved by the Supreme Court, the issue of 
rising generic drug prices still exists and will need to be addressed.  By 
viewing the health care system as a single, interconnected system, 
potential solutions involving different parties like pharmaceutical 
manufacturers, health insurers, pharmacy benefit managers, 
physicians, pharmacists, and patients could be created to limit the cost 
of health care. 
 
